The wages have also become irregular. Labour flexibility has become so prevalent that when there is no work, workers sometimes have no income; and during busy periods, a vast amount of overtime is often imposed in violation of national laws-at its worst, up to 4 Chen Peihua (Anita Chan), "Zhongguo laodong de quanqiuhua ji dui guoji laogong de yingxiang" (Globalised Chinese Labor and Its Impact on International Labor), Pipan yu zaizao, Taiwan, No. 9, July 2004, pp. 21-27. 5 For an explanation of this decline in wages see Anita Chan, "A 'Race to the Bottom': Globalisation and one hundred hours or more a week, especially at some of the private factories that produce for export.
Just as bad, the amount of unpaid wages has been increasing annually. I started collecting Chinese newspaper clippings on this problem in the mid-1990s. At that time, reports on migrant workers not getting paid were regarded as isolated incidents 7 . but as the years went by the problem became endemic. Even local governments began to see a need to intervene. Every year just before Chinese New Year, local governments would launch "chasing after wage-arrears campaigns" (zhuihui qianxin yundong) and then would proudly announce xxx million yuan had been "chased back" for the workers. The amounts soared year after year 8 . In Guangdong province the amounts "chased back" in 1995, 1997 and 1998 were 21 million yuan, 1.5 billion yuan and 5.6 billion yuan respectively.
But these amounts could only be the tip of the iceberg of the total amount of unpaid wages, since many cases were not reported. Even when reported and dealt with by the authorities, factories sometimes have simply refused to comply. According to one survey, 72.5% of migrants have suffered from varying degrees of wage defaults. There is little legal protection against unpaid wages 9 . The formal procedures taken by Labour Inspection Departments when demanding that a factory pay unpaid wages are so lax that which employs a larger labour force? The reports about migrant workers in the exportoriented factories being owed wages indicates the problem is possibly even more serious there, and the cumulative amount of unpaid wages higher.
In past years, the authorities did not find a solution to the problem of declining wages and unpaid wages. The best they could do was to help a minority of lucky workers to "chase back" wages before Chinese New Year. in the villages, causing a crisis of a "shortage of migrant workers" (mingong huang).
Unable to collectively bargain at the workplace, the rural population of China, without organising themselves, are engaging in a form of spontaneous collective action and initiating changes in China's macro-labour market. In this sense, from the poor work conditions something positive is being generated.
The settlement of workers' grievances through legal channels
A second type of change on the labour front relates to workers' growing awareness and use of the legal arena. The three main labour-related laws-the Enterprise protest.
Reactive legal protest activities
As economic restructuring steamed ahead at a rapid pace in the 1990s, and as labour violations became more serious and widespread, worker protests had by the mid1990s increased in scale and frequency. Much of this has been documented in the
Chinese press and by the international media and Western scholars. The new labour laws also had their effect. into legal procedural action. The laws not only have provided a platform for this, but workers' awareness of their legal rights also has been on the rise.
The majority of these cases involve serious labour abuses, such as owing workers wages in arrears (both in state and non-state enterprises), state workers being laid off, irregularity in pension payments, excessively long work hours, a lack of compensation for industrial injuries, and contraction of work-related diseases. According to one study, the less educated workers tend to take their grievances to the Visits and Letters Offices that are run by the cities' Labour Bureaus, People's Congresses or Party organs, while the more educated and skilled employees more often take their cases to legal arbitration 19 .
Either way, these are reactive claims, employing spaces provided by the legal system to redress injustices. They are not proactive claims to rights that are collective in nature, such as laying legal claims against management for refusing to collectively bargain, or against trade union officials for not protecting their rights 20 . In fact, the legal channels may even serve to avert a crisis situation where workers might actively seek to set up alternative trade unions or engage in mass protest, the reason in fact behind the government's policy to regulate industrial relations through legal channels.
The passage of the new laws has also led to a substantial number of lawyers and paralegals offering services to workers who seek compensation through law suits for industrial injuries and occupational diseases. The message: we Chinese are saying "no" to your foreign-imposed workplace standards.
The OECD's guidelines are obviously among the unwanted foreign standards.
The new push to unionise foreign-run enterprises
Under China's labour laws, all enterprises, including the private and foreign-owned ones, are supposed to contain an enterprise-level union branch, and the employer is supposed to anywhere in the world that Wal-Mart has made concessions to a trade union (in this case because the ACFTU has the support behind it of the Chinese government). Wal-Mart's total concession has set a powerful precedent. Other foreign enterprises are on notice that they will need to accept, and pay for, an ACFTU branch within their premises.
Enterprise-level trade union elections
One of the anti-sweatshop movement's demands has been that workers in the supplier factories should have freedom of association, not an easy aim to achieve in China. Some 
The ILO tripartite structure
Another avenue that may instigate change in China's industrial relations involves the International Labour Organisation (ILO). As a member state, China needs to establish a tripartite peak body comprising representatives from a national labour union federation, a peak employers' association, and a government organ, in order to send delegates from the three groups to the ILO's annual meetings in Geneva. Whereas the ACFTU serves as China's peak union organisation, there was no peak employers' association, so in 1999 the China Enterprise Confederation (CEC) was set up to serve this function. Its membership consists largely of state-enterprise management. In the ILO tripartite model the three parties are supposed to be independent and strong enough to carry out a meaningful "social dialogue". To the extent that such a peak system evolves, this potentially works to diffuse the statist nature of China's corporatist arrangements. Consultative Committee was set up in 2001, with similar committees at all administrative levels down to the rural townships. An ILO fact-finding commission found half a year after the tripartite committee's establishment that: "The tripartite system as presently constituted is unlikely to live up to the hopes placed in it both now and in the future… However, in all our interviews with trade union and employer representatives at municipal and national levels we found a clear commitment to developing the capacity of their respective organisations as independent representatives, able to articulate the interests, aspirations and grievances of their members within the system of social dialogue" 48 .
The fact-finding commission also noted that the "ACFTU has been the most active proponent of tripartite consultation as a means of protecting its members and maintaining social peace". As an independent observer who accompanied the twomember ILO commission in its investigations across China, I was impressed that officials from China's Ministry of Labour, which often sides with corporations in line with the government's pursuit of economic development, on two separate occasions remarked that the ACFTU is "powerful", as if the Ministry has difficulty cowing the ACFTU into accepting its decisions. This characterisation is in line with the assertive role the ACFTU has played in the national legislative process in helping to shape the content of China's labour laws. Thus, at the peak level the ACFTU appears to be successfully manoeuvring to make its voice heard and to attain greater bargaining power and at least a modicum of independence.
Anticipating the future
At the very top, as illustrated by the above incident, the ACFTU has tried to stake out its own position of labour representation as distinct from the state and employers. 
